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Abstract
I study the impact of the expansion in a national-level directed lending pro-
gram aimed at increasing institutional credit access of small firms in India. In
2006, the Government of India changed the criterion determining the small sta-
tus of firms, thereby expanding the pool of small firms eligible for directed credit.
Exploiting this expansion in the pool of firms eligible for directed lending, I an-
alyze the crowding out of the previously eligible firms by the recently eligible
firms. I find that the recently eligible firms disproportionately grew their bank
credit stock relative to previously eligible firms, without substituting other forms
of credit for bank loans. The recently eligible firms also experience a jump in
investment and sales growth post the policy change, while there is no evidence of
a similar improvement in the real outcomes for the previously eligible small firms.
The study brings to light the unintended effects of policy expansions, resulting in
hurting the smaller, more financially vulnerable firms, by distorting the lending
incentives of institutional lenders.
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1 Introduction
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) around the world contribute immensely to job
creation as well as output growth. They provide large scale employment opportunities
at a relatively low capital cost compared to larger industries, thereby improving the
standard of living of a large proportion of workers. SMEs also play a significant role
in the development of new products and new markets, even across the developing
world. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2005a) assess the relationship between SME,
income inequality and poverty, and find a strong and positive association between the
importance of SMEs and GDP per capita growth. Despite their huge contribution to
the economy and their potential to grow, SMEs are handicapped by poor productivity
due to sub-optimal scale of operation, technological obsolescence and supply chain
inefficiencies. They also face other obstacles such as working capital shortages, absence
of adequate and timely banking finance, ineffective marketing strategy and increasing
domestic and global competition, which result in constraining their expansion and
modernization.
Financial impediments, specifically, have a greater impact on the operation and
growth of SMEs. According to a World Bank Report in 2014, about 41% of SMEs in
the least developed countries reported access to finance as a major constraint to their
growth and development, 30% in middle-income countries and 15% in high-income
countries. Many studies have observed that access to external finance can significantly
enhance the performance of small firms. Access to adequate and timely finance is one
of the key factors that determine the ability of a firm to grow. Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2005b) find that the negative impact of credit related obstacles on
firm growth is stronger for small firms than large firms and stronger in countries with
underdeveloped financial systems.
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Given the importance of SMEs, governments and regulators often aim at increasing
access to credit for small and micro firms using targeted programs and incentives.
Some commonly offered benefits are preferential procurement from the government,
loan support via loan guarantees, directed credit programs, subsidies for investment
in technical training, assistance with marketing strategies and export sector related
incentives. In India, the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector is
the second largest manpower employer after agriculture, currently employing over 80
million workers1. According to the Fourth Census of MSME conducted between 2006-
2009, SMEs contributed about 45% to the value added in the manufacturing sector
and constituted about 40% to national exports. MSMEs also play a vital role in the
socio-economic uplift of the society, contributing heavily to employment generation and
more balanced regional growth. Among the challenges faced by MSMEs in India, the
lack of timely and adequate credit is one of the main obstacles for growth for MSMEs.
Relatively high cost of credit, requirement of posting collateral and limited access to
equity capital often put such firms outside the net of institutional sources of credit.
The Government of India has taken a number of measures to improve the credit access
of MSMEs as well as to improve productivity and competitiveness of MSMEs.
The focus of this paper is the expansion of a national level directed lending program
mandating banks in India to direct 40% of their total annual credit to vulnerable sectors
demarcated as priority sectors. The Priority Sector Lending program (PSL) was set up
to ensure credit access to financially vulnerable sectors such as agriculture, micro and
small businesses, low income housing, education and small scale sector exports. Under
the program, banks are free to set the interest rate on priority sector loans based on the
borrowers’ risk assessment2. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) monitors banks’ PSL
1 That figure pertains to about 17% of the workforce of India in 2009-2010
2 Barring few categories - for instance, for extremely small individual loans interest rates are capped.
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accounts quarter-by-quarter, and checks for shortfall from the PSL target. If banks
fall short of the PSL target, they are required to lend the shortfall amount to Rural
Development Bonds at an interest rate decided by the Reserve Bank of India. This
interest rate is usually close to the bank rate set by RBI on a quarterly basis. If a bank
repeatedly falls short of meeting this target, it runs the risk of being disallowed from
expanding its branch network across the country.
Table 1: Revision of the Investment Cut-off Determining Small Enterprise Status
Before Policy Change (Before 2007) After Policy Change (After 2007)
2.5 - 10 (Always Eligible : AE) 2.5 - 10 (Always Eligible : AE)~w
10 - 50 (Recently Eligible : RE)
Note: The value of investment in plant and machinery in INR Million. Small firms loans are
automatically eligible as Priority Sector Lending.
Small firm status in India is determined on the basis of the value of plant and ma-
chinery of firms and a predetermined investment ceiling serves as an upper bound that
determines small status3. Any firm with investment in plant and machinery below the
decided ceiling is automatically considered a small firm and its bank loans fall under
the PSL category. In October 2006, with the passing of the Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprise Development Act (MSMED) by the Ministry of Small Scale Industries, there
was a substantial increase in the investment ceiling for small firms, among other policy
changes, as summarized by Table 1. The revision of the investment ceiling led to an
expansion in the pool of small firms eligible for directed lending, thus, improving credit
access for the recently eligible small firms (RE firms).
The Act also directed the banking sector to achieve a 20% year-on-year growth of
loans made to small and medium enterprises and ultimately double the credit available
3 This definition applies only to manufacturing sector firms.
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Figure 1: Growth in the Bank Credit of Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs). The
figure shows the growth in total bank credit of all MSEs across using firm level data
from 2004− 2010. Source: The Micro and Small Enterprises Annual Report 2010-11
to SMEs in the next five years. The year-wise growth in bank credit to the micro and
small firms sector4 is shown in Figure 1. In the absence of internal size-based PSL
targets, this policy push was bound to increase the competition among AE and RE
firms to grow their bank credit eligible as PSL from banks across the country. According
to the Micro and Small Enterprises Annual Report of 2010-2011, bank credit to these
firms did more than double between 2006-2007 and 2009-2010.
After the enactment of the MSMED Act of 2006, more firms were defined as small
firms and bank loans made to them fell under the PSL category. I compare the
differential credit growth and sales growth of firms whose eligibility was not retained
4 The jump is partially due to inclusion of service sector small firms in the PSL eligible category.
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(AE), to the firms that gained eligibility post the policy change (RE firms). Figure 2
and Figure 3 plot the sum of total bank borrowings and sum of total sales, respectively,
of the two groups. It appears the stock of bank borrowings and total sales of RE firms
rose much more compared to AE firms. Most of this effect came in the year following
the policy change i.e. in 2008. I find that borrowings from non-bank sources also
rose for RE firms, implying that RE firms that received increased bank credit did
not substitute other sources of credit with bank loans, and in fact increased overall
borrowing post the policy change5.
Figure 2: Total Bank Credit Across the Expanded Pool of PSL Eligible Firms.
Source: Author’s calculations based on firm level data from the Prowess database
After the policy change, banks had another avenue to increase their PSL to achieve
the mandated targets i.e. by lending to the set of firms that were redefined as small
5 Graphs plotting total other borrowings of the two groups of firms can be made available on request.
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firms. These redefined RE firms are by virtue of their size of investment in plant and
machinery, bigger than AE firms. Hence, they can post more collateral against bank
borrowings. Additionally, being bigger than AE firms, they possibly have an advantage
over AE firms in terms of producing detailed accounts of their business operations and
proof of borrowing activity with other creditors. Bank officials, on the other hand,
face the choice of achieving growth in SME loans, either by increasing lending to RE
firms, or by spreading out the increased lending across both AE and RE firms. If banks
preferred to achieve the overall PSL target by disproportionately stepping up credit to
RE firms, perhaps because they can achieve targets by making fewer but bigger loans
to RE firms; AE firms would suffer as a consequence of the policy expansion.
Figure 3: Total Firm Sales Across the Expanded Pool of PSL Eligible Firms.
Source: Author’s calculations based on firm level data from the Prowess database
Next, I arrange small firms into buckets according to the level of investment in plant
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and machinery to study the change in bank borrowings across these buckets. I find that
the group of firms just above the new investment ceiling benefited disproportionately
relative to all the groups whose plant and machinery investment were below the new
ceiling, indicative of a crowding-out effect at the investment ceiling. The empirical
analysis presented examines the side-effects of a policy action aimed at increasing
credit access to small firms, and if, it had in fact, resulted in hurting the previously
eligible, smaller and hence the more vulnerable of the small businesses in the country.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I provide a literature review.
Section 3 provides the details of the institutional setting in which banks, firms and
regulators function in India. Section 4 describes the choice of the data used for the
study. Section 5 describes in detail the empirical strategy. Section 6 attempts all
robustness tests. Section 7 presents the results of the study. In Section 8, I conclude
and discuss policy implications.
2 Literature Review
A positive relationship between increased access to finance and firm growth has been
established by numerous studies (Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Mak-
simovic (1998)). Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008) show that access to
finance is the most robust determinant of growth rate of firms across the world, among
other important factors such as crime and political instability. Using cross-country
firm-level survey data, Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005b) find that among
small firms, those reporting lower growth rates are those that face greater financial con-
straints. Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007) find that access to credit boosts entry
among small firms and helps small firms take advantage of growth opportunities espe-
cially in growing sectors where large firms would be predominant otherwise.
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The differential effect of financial constraints on firm growth across firms of dif-
ferent sizes is also well documented. Most studies suggest that this effect is stronger
for smaller firms. Using cross-country survey data from firms of 54 countries, Beck,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005b) investigate a rich set of obstacles reported
by firms of all sizes. The authors find that financing constraints affect firm growth
more adversely among small firms relative to large firms. In another study using data
on Portuguese firms, Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) find that small firms are likely to
grow much faster than large firms when their financial constraints are eased.
Given the importance of small firms in developing as well as developed economies,
governments and regulators around the world assume the responsibility of helping
these financially vulnerable enterprises by regulating and channeling credit via targeted
programs and policies. Credit guarantees, credit subsidies, tax breaks and eased legal
requirements are often targeted at specific borrowers such as small exporters, small
and medium sized firms, and agricultural workers. This paper empirically analyzes the
effect of a policy change aimed at stepping up credit access for small firms in India
by way of expanding the pool of eligible small firms. The Government of India has
a nation-wide program of directed credit facilitated via the banking system. Banks
are mandated to lend at least 40% of their annual credit to the financially weaker
sections referred to as the priority sectors. As a result of this quota, banks are always
in search for relatively safe priority sector investment opportunities to reach the 40%
target. When loans made to firms with bigger collateral and more financial information
become eligible under priority sector lending, banks may unintentionally be incentivized
to step up credit only to such bigger enterprises in order to grow their priority sector
portfolio, leaving behind the previously eligible small firms.
Many studies have evaluated the effectiveness of similar directed lending programs.
Lelarge, Sraer and Thesmar (2010) exploit the extension of guarantees to new sectors
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in France and find that newly eligible firms raised more external finance at lower
interest rates, which subsequently led to an increase in the probability of bankruptcy.
Bach (2013) studies a policy of bank loans made from subsidized funds to specific
sectors in France and finds evidence of increased debt financing of targeted small firms,
with no subsequent surge in default risk. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) analyze loan-level
information of one of the biggest Indian banks. Using a policy reform and a subsequent
reversal in policy that decided the eligibility threshold of Indian SMEs between 1998
and 2000, they find large effects of being prioritized on firms’ bank borrowings, profit
and growth. Studies in this area have also documented the adverse or unintended effects
of such directed lending policies. Zia (2008) finds that small firms in Pakistan reduce
their sales after a reversal of eligibility for subsidized export credit while large, listed
and group firms did not suffer as a result. Cole (2009) finds evidence of political cycles
in agricultural lending via such programs in India. A working paper6 by Kumar (2014)
documents the credit misallocation across agricultural and manufacturing sectors in
India due to the presence of political cycles in bank lending. In another working
paper, Bhue, Prabhala and Tantri (2016) discuss the strategic slowdown in growth
of investment in newly eligible small firms near the investment cut-off compared to
the newly eligible small firms away from the cut-off, post the policy change, thereby
defeating the very purpose of such close targeting. They do not address the differential
impact of the policy change across previously eligible and recently eligible small firms,
which is the focus of my paper.
While a lot of research has been conducted to investigate presence of credit con-
straints and political capture, to my knowledge, no study has assessed the impact of
expanding credit policies in terms of a shift in the distribution of beneficiary firms. I
contribute to this literature by studying such undesired adverse effects of expanding
6 The most recent version of the paper posted online is dated March 2016
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directed credit programs, by investigating the crowding-out of smaller firms when such
policies are expanded.
In this paper, I explore the potential spillover effects of extending a national-level
directed lending program to bigger small firms7, thereby affecting the distribution of
directed credit growth across RE and AE firms in India.
3 Institutional Setting
3.1 The Indian Banking Sector
India’s banking system is organized into Commercial, Regional Rural and Co-operative
Banking. Both public8 and private banks (domestic and foreign) fall under the com-
mercial banking category. Public banks are bifurcated into the State Bank Group and
the Nationalized Banks Group. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the central bank of
India. As of 2016, the banking system consisted of 26 public sector banks (controlling
72% of banking assets), 25 private sector banks (controlling 21% of banking assets),
43 foreign banks (controlling 7% of banking assets), 56 development focused regional
rural banks, 1,589 urban cooperative banks and 93,550 rural cooperative banks.
3.2 The Priority Sector Lending Program
All commercial banks in India, including private sector banks, are mandated to direct
40% of their total annual credit to sectors demarcated as priority sectors. The priority
sectors include those sectors that impact large sections of the population, the weaker
sections of the society and the sectors which are employment-intensive such as agricul-
7 Bigger by way of higher investment in plant and machinery.
8 The government is the majority shareholder of public banks comprising about 70% of the market
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ture, and micro and small enterprises. This nation-wide directed lending program is
referred to as Priority Sector Lending (PSL) program. Over the years, the list of eligi-
ble categories of loans under PSL has been expanded to include low income housing,
education loans, export credit and renewable energy sector. The RBI annually updates
and announces the sectors which are eligible as priority sectors. It also informs banks
about internal targets to be met in addition to the overall 40% target, and about limits
associated with loans to priority sectors that will actually qualify as PSL. Shortfalls
from announced targets are closely monitored by the RBI officials. In recent years,
PSL Certificates have been issued by banks as a support mechanism for banks that are
not able to fulfill the quota. These instruments incentivize PSL surplus banks to sell
their excess PSL achievement of the 40% target to PSL shortfall banks.
While loans made to micro and small enterprises across all industries count as
priority sector advances for all commercial banks in India, banks are not subject to
an internal target in terms of the share of PSL credit that comprises loans to micro
and small enterprise. The mandatory PSL advances for domestic banks is 40% of
their annual net credit and for foreign banks it is 32% of their annual net credit. Any
shortfall from the above limit is to be invested at very low interest rate in agencies
that lend to above category. These targets are announced and updated by the Reserve
Bank of India by way of circulars published annually.
To ensure fair distribution of credit to all segments, targets within the sub categories
are provided. Although there is no internal target within the overall 40% PSL target
for the small and micro enterprise group, there are sub-targets in place for the share
of credit to micro enterprises. Table 2 lists the sub-targets of PSL during the year
2006-2007. While sub-targets for micro enterprise9 are allotted, no such safeguard is
in place for the small enterprises.
9 Firms with investment in plant and machinery upto INR 0.5 Million
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Table 2: Priority Sector Lending Targets at Sector and Sub-Sector Level in 2006
Sector Sub-Sector Target Internal Target
Agriculture – 18%
Weaker Sections – 10%
Micro & Small Enterprises (MSEs) –
— Micro Enterprises I 0.0 - 0.5 INR Mln 40% of total (MSE)
— Micro Enterprises II 0.5 - 2.5 INR Mln 20% of total (MSE)
— Small Enterprises 0.5 - 2.5 INR Mln –
Total Priority Sector 40%
Note: Micro Enterprises Group I and II correspond to micro firms with investment in plant
and machinery upto INR 0.5 Million and between INR 0.5-2.5 Million, respectively.
3.3 The MSMED Act of 2006
The regulatory change that I exploit is the MSMED Act of 2006. In October 2006, the
Parliament of India enacted the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development
Act10. The Act provided a variety of facilities such as improved credit access, skill and
training development, technology upgradation, market linkages and marketing support.
With the enactment of the MSMED Act, the upward revision of the investment
ceiling led to an expansion in the pool of small firms eligible for directed lending, thus,
improving credit access for the recently eligible small firms (RE firms). The always
eligible firms (AE firms) continued to remain eligible as usual. Table 3 contains the
details of the definitions of manufacturing sector firms before and after the revision.
Medium firms were defined in this way for the first time after the passing of this Act.
10 A different set of rules were laid out for manufacturing sector and service sector. This study
focuses on the manufacturing sector. Capital investment cut-offs for manufacturing sector small
firms were defined based on investment in plant and machinery.
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Table 3: Firm Categories by Size before and after the Policy Change in 2006-07
Enterprise Size Before Policy Change After Policy Change
Small Enterprises 2.5 - 10 2.5 - 50
( Always Eligible ) ( Always + Recently Eligible )
Medium & Large > 50 > 50
( Never Eligible) ( Never Eligible)
Note: The cut-off value of investment in plant and machinery is in INR Million.
4 Data
4.1 Data Sources
I use firm-level data for this study from the Prowess database of the Centre for Mon-
itoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The database provides the detailed firm-level data
for over 18,000 manufacturing formal sector firms. The financial information available
through this database is extracted from audited financial statements, and the stock
and credit rating data are compiled from other published sources. The key variables
for this study are those relating to the break down of borrowings of the firm into var-
ious institutional sources. Prowess provides time series on firm-level bank borrowing,
total institutional borrowings, thus allowing me to observe the changing composition
of borrowings by lender type across the period considered. Data on value of plant and
machinery is used to construct the firm groups based on their investment, into always
eligible (AE) firms, recently eligible (RE) firms and never eligible (NE) firms.
The overall coverage of the Prowess database is extensive. Prowess covers firms
that account for about 75 % of corporate taxes and 95% of the excise duty collected
by the Indian government. Prowess also classifies firms by industry according to the
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NIC code11, which is the Indian equivalent of the SIC12 classification scheme. Any
changes made to methodology are applied across years to keep variables in the accounts
comparable. Due to its coverage and accuracy, the database has been increasingly used
in research related to the Indian industrial sector.
An alternate source of data is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), also used by
researchers extensively to study the manufacturing sector in India. The ASI data are
compiled based on surveys at the factory level which do not capture audited financials
of the associated firms. Moreover, the ASI does not report the ‘bank borrowings’
information at the factory-level or the ‘plant and machinery’ value across the entire
sample. The ASI does not allow tracking within firm time series of most financial
variables that are necessary for this study. Bank loan officers are more likely to use
audited financial data to calculate the cut-offs determining firm size i.e. whether a firm
is small, medium or large by definition13, hence the choice of the Prowess database.
The national level industry aggregates such as output and value added series are
taken from the Historical Time Series of the Annual Survey of Industries, collected by
the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. These series span years
2003-2009. To deflate all nominal variables, I use the Wholesale Price Index (WPI)
obtained directly from the website of the Ministry of Commerce Industry. While
bank borrowings and debt data are deflated by the All-Commodities WPI, firms-level
variables such as sales, assets, and profits, as well as the industry-level aggregates are
deflated by the corresponding industry-specific WPI. The details of data sources and
industry categorization are provided in Section B.3 in Appendix B.
11 I use the industry code at the 2-digit level for my study from the National Industrial Classification
for India (2008).
12 Standard Industrial Classification system for classifying industries by a four-digit code used as a
standard across most countries.
13 This fact was confirmed with officials at the RBI as well as with the managers of two Indian
banks - State Bank of India and HDFC Bank.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 4, I present the descriptive statistics of the sample of firms in this study in
the financial year 2006-2007. I assign firms to one of the three groups – AE, RE or
NE14, based on the value of its investment in plant and machinery in 2006-2007.
In 2006-2007, the average sales of AE small firms is about one-half of the average
sales of RE small firms. The average investment in fixed assets for AE firms is less than
half of that of RE small firms. The average utilization seem almost uniform across all
the groups, while average profitability is decreasing as we go from NE to AE firms.
The NE firms, on the other hand are bigger by a factor of about twenty vis-a-vis the
RE firms. An interesting fact to note is that on average, share of bank borrowings of
the three groups are decreasing as we go from NE to AE firms. This is indicative of
the higher dependence of AE firms on bank credit.
I exclude exporters with greater than 10% of their sales being exported since all
SME exporters during the years after 2007 had access to subsidized credit (export
loans) via an Interest Rate Subsidy Program15. The summary statistics for all firms,
including exporters, is presented in Table 15 in Appendix A. I also carefully exclude
firms from the 41 items covering broad groups of sectors - Hosiery, Hand Tools, Drugs &
Pharmaceuticals, Stationery and Sports Goods, whose investment cut-off was enhanced
to INR 10 Million in 2001-200216. The details of such bank credit related policies are
announced via Master Circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India. I make the
above exclusions based on careful reading of these circulars, and clarifications from the
officials at the Banking Statistics Department at the Reserve Bank of India.
14 Always Eligible (INR 2.5− 10), Recently Eligible (INR 10− 50), Never Eligible (>50)
15 The Interest Rate Subvention Scheme announced in five phases rbi2010-export-credit-rates.
16 Details issues in circulars issues by the Reserve Bank of India rbi-2006-psl-mastercircular.
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5 Empirical Strategy
5.1 Selection of Firm Groups, Policy Timing and the Data
Selection of Groups based on Firm Size
Regulatory policies focused on increasing SME credit access often target specific regions
or specific production activities. Depending on their success, these are extended or
withdrawn over a period of time. The particular regulatory change I exploit is an
upwards revision in the investment cut-off determining ’small’ status of firms, thereby
giving more firms access to loans under the directed lending program in India, the
Priority Sector Lending program (PSL). This policy revision brought a huge number of
small firms across all industries, regions and ownership types, under the PSL category.
I will use this variation in status of firms for the estimation of exposure to the program,
by comparing firms across sectors in the AE, RE and NE groups. Unlike most countries
where firm size is determined by number of full-time employees on the firms’ payroll,
in India firm size is determined by the nominal investment in plant and machinery17,
excluding land and buildings.
To study the effect this policy change had on firm growth and firm institutional
borrowing, I analyze the differential effect across AE, RE and NE firms, before and
after the policy change18 There is not enough coverage on micro enterprises for the
empirical analysis to be meaningful19. Due to the difference in size, AE and RE firms
may be too small to follow the same trends as NE firms. I control for time trends in
all categories separately to account for such differences.
17 This method of size characterization limits the use of accounting tricks to subvert the intent of
the categorization, and bankers can access this information through audited reports.
18 This methodology only allows for an intent-to-treat estimate.
19 I will study the effect on micro-enterprises using confidential district-industry-level data on bank
credit of micro, small and medium firms, made accessible by the Reserve Bank of India.
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Selection of Timing of Policy Change
Since the MSMED Act of 2006 was passed midway through the financial year20 in
September, 2006, I use the following financial year (2007-2008) as the first year after
the policy change. I use data on firm variables and firm financials starting 2004 and up
until 2009. I do not go beyond the year 2009 due to a change in the interest rate set-
ting regime, and the introduction of a credit guarantee scheme, designed for improving
small enterprise credit access. These changes were targeted at easing credit terms for
small enterprises all across the country, and applied special benefits towards smaller
loans even among the pool of small business loans. Such policy changes are likely to
distort the true picture of the crowding-out of AE firms.
Selection of the Data
I focus on analyzing the credit and investment growth of small firms before and after the
implementation of the MSMED Act of 2006. The main financial variables of interest
are therefore, bank borrowings, investment in capital and total borrowings. Ideally, I
would like to compare bank borrowings of AE firms, RE firms vis-a-vis NE firms for the
universe of firms borrowing from the banking sector, however, such data bank-firm-loan
matched data is not available even with the central bank of India, the Reserve Bank of
India21 In the absence of such data, the second best option is to use firm-level audited
financial data, in order to control for firm -specific effects as well as industry-time
trends corresponding to these firms.
I select the panel of firms based on the following criteria over the years: I keep
20 The financial year in India runs from April 1 - March 31
21 Due to a change in firm size definition, the bank loan accounts information submitted by all
commercial banks to the RBI, is not comparable before and after the policy change year. After
the definition update, banks also re-cassified RE firms loans to ’small’ in addition to the AE firms
loans, without any way to identify AE borrowers from RE borrowers.
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firms whose financials were available for all the years in the chosen period, with values
between the 1st and the 99th percentile based on total sales, total assets and total
invested capital. I exclude all firms that reported exports greater than 10% of total
sales. Exporting firms are excluded because a different set of credit rate policies and
guarantees apply to exporters. Moreover, starting 2007, SME exporters were eligible
for a 2% interest rate subsidy which was later increased to 3%. Such differences could
distorting the true analysis here.
Effect of the Policy Change
Smaller firms are less likely to get access to institutional data. They are also less likely
to maintain proper financial accounts, which hinders loan officers’ ability to assess
the credit-worthiness of the borrowing enterprises. After the policy push, banks can
potentially achieve faster growth in PSL loans to small businesses either by making
fewer, big sized loans to RE firms or by growing credit extended to both groups of firms.
The smaller collateral posted reduces the incentive of banks to extend many loans of
a small size, once RE firms, now also qualifying under the priority sector lending, are
available as credit seekers. In other words, after the policy change, banks have another
avenue to increase their PSL loans portfolio and achieve mandatory targets. Since the
RE firms are bigger small firms compared to AE firms, they can post more collateral
per loan.
The interesting effect to explore post such a policy action is the presence of a bias
in the lending incentive of banks, away from AE firms and towards RE firms. Bound
by the annual PSL targets, banks have to find a way to increase small business loans,
else they face penalties22. Under the assumption of a fixed cost of monitoring or a
22 Any shortfall in PSL lending targets must be lent by commercial banks to Rural Development
Bonds at very low rate decided by the Reserve Bank of India
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fixed cost of establishing firm-bank relationship, I expect the banks to favor stepping
up loans made to the RE firms. AE firms are smaller compared to RE firms by virtue
of size-based definition. A lot more small ticket loans would have to be made in order
to cover the directed lending quota as well as achieve the growth in small business
lending, compared to bigger loans that can be now made to RE firms. Bigger collateral
and more detailed financial records of RE firms could bias banks’ loan decisions in
terms of which firms’ credit they want to step up. I seek out evidence of such crowding
out controlling for firm and industry level demand side trends.
In essence, I am using a difference-in-difference strategy to estimate the impact of
increased lending to small firms by exploiting the quasi-natural experiment provided
by the regulatory change that revised the investment cut-off, thereby expanding the
eligible pool of firms for PSL.
5.2 Survivor Bias and Sample Selection Issues
The final sample of firms only comprises of those firms whose financial variables are
available from 2004-2010, or only those firms that survived the entire period. From an
econometric point of view, the results of this study are applicable for the firms that
survived this entire time period. Since I choose the AE as well as the RE group of firms
using the same criterion, it seems fair that I interpret the results as the effect of the
policy change on the most stable firms. Moreover, the sample of small firms available
in this data are not representative of the universe of small firms in India. This selection
disproportionately includes firms that report their audited accounts, but to the extend
that firms following strict book keeping rules are less likely to be hurt compared to
firms that do not, the results should easily hold in the extended set of all small firms23.
23 It is mandatory for all medium and large sized firms to register and maintain official accounts.
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5.3 Econometric Specification
The main variables of interest in this study are bank borrowings of firms as well as
borrowings from other lending sources.
5.3.1 Effect of the Policy Change on Bank Borrowings
∆yist = β0 + β1×(REi×Aftert) + β2×(AEi×Aftert) + β3×(Aftert)
+ β4×AEi + β5×REi + β6×NEi + β7×(REi×t) + β8×(AEi×t)
+ β
′
Xit + γi + λt + δ
′
IOst + ist
(1)
where yist is the log of deflated bank borrowings of firm i, industry s, time t. The
indicator variables AEi, REi and NEi equal 1 if the firm belonged to the AE, RE
or NE category in the year 2006-2007, respectively. The indicator Aftert is equal to
1 if the year is after the financial year 2006-2007, the year of passing the Act. The
firms-level variables Xit that I control for include firm size (firm’s total sales), total
fixed assets, profitability ratio and the default ratio. Detailed description of these firm
controls is available in Section B.2 in Appendix B. I also include firm fixed effects and
year effects in my regression. To control for industry-specific time trends that may
affect firm borrowing, I include industry aggregates, i.e. output and industry output
growth24. All borrowings are deflated using the wholesale price index (WPI). All other
firm-level variables are deflated using industry-specific deflators25.
Following the literature, I focus on the first difference in logs of deflated bank
borrowings, since bank borrowing is a stock variable and is known to be persistent with
24 Two-digit NIC industry codes are used to categorize the industry corresponding to each firm.
Industry output and industry output growth at the two digit industry level are obtained from
the Annual Survey of Industries.
25 All-India wholesale industry-specific deflators, published by the Ministry of Industry, are used to
deflate firm-level variables.
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fat-tailed distributions. For similar reasons, I use the same transformation in the other
outcomes as well. I follow Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) in their treatment
of clustering at the level of treatment for difference-in-difference type estimation, and
cluster standard errors at the level of the treatment status i.e. at the firm-level. As a
check, I also estimate the following standard errors: conventional, heteroskedasticity-
robust, clustered at two-digit industry-level, and find that the firm-level clustering
produces the most conservative standard errors.
The coefficients of interest are β1 and β2, which capture the relative differential effect
in terms of growth of bank borrowings, due to the change in eligibility of firms into PSL
across the Always Eligible and Recently Eligible firms, vis-a-vis the reference category
NE. Since year fixed effects and industry time trend controls have been included in the
specification, the estimation of the impact of the policy change accounts for common
trends in the demand and supply of debt and for time varying structural differences
among industries in the demand and supply of debt.
Within-group comparisons
Next, I divide the RE group (INR Million 10 - 50) into terciles based on their value
of plant and machinery in 2006-2007, to analyze within group differences in impact of
the policy change. Thus, effectively, there are four comparison groups now, and one
reference group. I winsorize at the 1% level.
(i) Group AE : INR Million (2.5 - 10)
(ii) Group RE1 : INR Million (10.3 - 19.9)
(iii) Group RE2 : INR Million (19.9 - 35.4)
(iv) Group RE3 : INR Million (35.4 - 49.9)
(v) Group NE : INR Million (> 50)
24
I use the following specification to study the differential impact of the policy change
across these groups constructed by slabs of plant and machinery investment of firms.
∆yist = β0 +
g=3∑
g=1
βREg×1[REg]×Aftert + β2×(AEi×Aftert) + β3×(Aftert)
+ β4×AEi + β5×REi + β6×NEi + β7×(REi×t) + β8×(AEi×t)
+ β
′
Xit + γi + λt + δ
′
IOst + ist
(2)
where the coefficients of interest are βREg (for g = 1, 2, 3), and β2, capturing the
differential effect across the sub-groups withing RE. As in the earlier specifications, I
include firm and year fixed effects, and industry-year trend controls.
5.3.2 Effect of the Policy Change on Other Borrowings
In order to check if the RE firms simply used bank borrowings to substitute for other
financing, I use the same specification given by Equation 1 with growth of other bor-
rowings as the dependent variable. These borrowings include all other debt of a firm
obtained from sources other than banks. If the coefficients β1 and β2 obtained from
this regression are negative and statistically significant, it is evidence in favor of firms
substituting the increased bank loans for other sources of credit.
An interesting feature of this quasi-natural experiment that I exploit in this study
is the occurrence of the post-Act period which coincides with the onset of an important
recession. While most commercial banks in India were not directly exposed to the
recession, the simultaneous liquidity crunch and growth slow down eroded net worth of
banks and firms. Had the banks’ and firms’ net worth been higher for macroeconomic
reasons, it would be difficult to control for dampening credit constraints in the economy.
This period of slow-down in bank lending activity as well as industrial growth, lends
these estimates stronger external validity.
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5.3.3 Effect of the Policy Change on Real Outcomes
I analyze changes in real outcomes of the firms in AE, RE and NE groups, following
the policy change. Specifically, I study their pre and post growth in investment and
total sales. The coefficients of interest still are β1 and β2, which capture the differential
effect of the change in PSL eligibility of firms, on investment and sales growth. I also
repeat the following estimations with the RE group split in terciles.
Impact on Firm Investment:
Ii,s,t
Ki,s,t−1
= β0 + β1×(REi×Aftert) + β2×(AEi×Aftert) + β3×(Aftert)
+ β4×AEi + β5×REi + β6×NEi + β′Xit + γi + λt + δ′IOst + ist
(3)
For the investment-growth regression in Equation 3, the dependent variable is
Ii,s,t/Ki,s,t−1, which is the investment to capital ratio. I control for firm-level variables
- CashF lowist
Ki,s,t−1
, the cash flow to capital ratio and ∆salesi,s,t,t−1, the lagged growth in firm
sales.
Impact on Firm Sales Growth:
∆salesi,s,t = β0 + β1×(REi×Aftert) + β2×(AEi×Aftert) + β3×(Aftert)
+ β4×AEi + β5×REi + β6×NEi + β′Xit + γi + λt + δ′IOst + ist
(4)
For the sales-growth regression in Equation 4, the dependent variable is ∆salesi,s,t,
which is the change in log(Sales). I control for one period lagged cash flow to capital
ratio
CashF lowi,s,t−1
Ki,s,t−2
.
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6 Results
6.3.1 Effect of the Policy Change on Bank Borrowings
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of Equation 1 in the sample of firms.
After controlling for firm-specific factors and for time trends, RE firms’ bank loans grew
about 19.2 percentage points faster after the policy change relative to the reference
category of never eligible NE firms. In contrast, the growth in bank loans of AE firms
decreased by 25.2 percentage points, in relative terms. It is interesting to note the
magnitude of these coefficients, despite a negative trend in the data for RE firms and
a positive trend for AE firms. These results also confirm the evidence from the rapidly
growing sum of bank borrowings of RE firms in the sample compared to the stagnating
AE firms as presented in Figure 2.
In the absence of bank-firm-loan matched data to study the impact of the policy
change, these are the best available estimates of the crowding-out of previously eligible,
smaller firms, after expanding the PSL eligibility to a new set of firms.
Within-group Comparisons
Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equation 2. The RE group is categorized
into terciles (RE1, RE2 and RE3), to analyze which whether size variation, even within
the RE group, made a significant difference in growth of bank loans26. I find that the
3rd tercile RE3, i.e. experience the biggest jump in growth of bank loans of about 23
percentage points, followed by the second to largest group, the second tercile (RE2) by
25.4 percentage points, in relative terms. The bank loan growth of AE firms decreased
by 25.1 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level.
26 These coefficients are estimated relative to the reference group, i.e. the NE firms that did not
enjoy the PSL priviledge before or after the policy change
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Table 5: Impact of Policy Change on Growth Rate of Bank Borrowings
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on the growth of bank borrowings across the firm groups, corresponding to Equation
1. The dependent variable is change in log of bank borrowings. The indicators REi and
AEi equal 1 if the firm belongs to that group in 2006-2007. The indicator Aftert equals
1 for years after 2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size, fixed
assets and profitability are log(sales), growth(fixed assets) and the EBIT ratio, respectively.
Firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated.
All borrowings are deflated using the WPI, and firm sales and assets are deflated using
industry-specific deflators. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in
parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
REi × Aftert 0.066* 0.176** 0.192**
(0.039) (0.069 ) (0.086)
AEi × Aftert -0.036 -0.141 -0.252**
(0.061) (.094) (0.119)
REi × t -0.038* -0.056*
(0.019) (0.029)
AEi × t 0.037 0.078*
(0.030) (0.045)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
These results point to the disparity even within the RE group in terms of loan
growth due to changing lending incentives towards the bigger of the RE firms. Due to
data restrictions, I can only estimate the differential impact of a policy push on the
intensive margin. Given that < 10% of small firms have access to institutional finance
in India, this poses a huge concern for complete rationing of AE firms, especially for
those not using formal credit27.
27 The RBI maintains aggregate loan accounts in the banking system, but doesn’t record firm-level
characteristics, making it impossible to track the AE and RE loans growth separately.
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Table 6: Impact of Policy Change on Growth Rate of Bank Borrowings
using RE Sub-groups
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on the growth of bank borrowings across the firm groups and sub-groups of REi firms,
corresponding to Equation 2. The dependent variable is change in log of bank borrowings.
The REi is split into terciles - RE1, RE2 and RE3. REi and AEi are indicators which
equal 1 if the firm belongs to that group in 2006-2007. The indicator Aftert equals 1
for years after 2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size, fixed
assets and profitability are log(sales), growth(fixed assets) and the EBIT ratio, respectively.
Firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated.
All borrowings are deflated using the WPI, and firm sales and assets are deflated using
industry-specific deflators. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in
parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
AEi × Aftert -0.036 -0.141 -0.251**
(0.061) (0.098) (0.119)
RE1 × Aftert 0.168** 0.281** 0.080
(0.066) (0.111) (0.149)
RE2 × Aftert 0.009 0.185* 0.254*
(0.058) (0.106) (0.133)
RE3 × Aftert 0.038 0.079 0.227**
(0.063) (0.109) (0.110)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Group-level Time Trends No Yes Yes
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
6.3.2 Effect of the Policy Change on Other Borrowings
In Table 7, I present the results of estimates from the regression in Equation 1,
replacing the dependent variable with growth in other borrowings comprising all other
debt obtained from sources other than banks, both long term and short term borrow-
ings.
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Table 7: Impact of Policy Change on Growth Rate of Other Borrowings
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on the growth of borrowings other than bank loans, across the firm groups, corre-
sponding to Equation 1. The dependent variable is change in log of other borrowings.
The indicators REi and AEi equal 1 if the firm belongs to that group in 2006-2007. The
indicator Aftert equals 1 for years after 2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Controls
for firm size, fixed assets and profitability are log(sales), growth(fixed assets) and the EBIT
ratio, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are
included as indicated. All borrowings are deflated using the WPI, and firm sales and assets
are deflated using industry-specific deflators. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level,
and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (yt/Assetst−1) (1) (2) (3)
REi × Aftert 0.009 0.071** 0.041*
(0.048) (0.033) (0.024)
AEi × Aftert 0.007 0.045* 0.033
(0.034) (0.027) (0.021)
REi × t -0.024 -0.004
(0.024) (0.014)
AEi × t -0.015 0.001
(0.020) (0.001)
Number Of Observations 9,192 9,192 8,820
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
The coefficient on post-policy period variable for RE firms is statistically significant
and indicates an increase in other borrowings by about 4.1 percentage points. This is in
some sense a test of the presence of credit constraints, i.e. whether the newly privileged
RE firms simply used the increased bank credit to substitute for other sources of
financing, or they do not substitute these bank loans with other forms of credit. There
is no evidence to support such a substitution. In fact the positive coefficient on the
RE post-policy variable indicates these firms grew there other borrowings as well. The
coefficient on the AE post-policy variable is positive but not significant.
30
6.3.3 Effect of the Policy Change on Real Outcomes
In Table 8, I report the coefficients from estimating Equation 3 and 4, i.e. the real
effects of the policy change until 2009 controlling for cash flow and sales growth . The
RE firms experience an increase in both investment and sales growth, in a difference-
in-difference sense, by about 3.1 and 5.1 percentage points, respectively. The sign of
β2 for AE firms is negative, although statistically insignificant.
Table 8: Impact of Policy Change on Investment and Sales Growth
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on real outcomes - investment and sales growth, corresponding to Equation 3 and 4.
The dependent variables are the investment-to-capital ratio and total sales growth. The
indicators REi and AEi equal 1 if the firm belongs to that group in 2006-2007. The indicator
Aftert equals 1 for years after 2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Firm-level controls
include the cash-flow ratio and one-period lagged sales growth. Firm and year fixed effects,
as well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated. Firm sales and assets are
deflated using industry-specific deflators. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and
reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆salest,t−1
AEi × Aftert 0.011 -0.039
(0.017) (.094)
REi × Aftert 0.031*** 0.051*
(0.012) (0.026 )
CF i,s,t
Ki,s,t−1 0.093***
(0.023)
∆salest−1,t−2 -0.007
(0.008)
CF i,s,t−1
Ki,s,t−2 0.034
(0.026)
Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
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Table 9: Impact of Policy Change on Investment and Sales Growth
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on real outcomes - investment and sales growth, across the firm groups and sub-groups
of REi firms, corresponding to Equation 3 and 4. The dependent variables are the
investment-to-capital ratio and total sales growth. The REi is split into terciles or by the
median. REi and AEi are indicators which equal 1 if the firm belongs to that group in
2006-2007. The indicator Aftert equals 1 for years after 2006-2007, the year of passing of
the Act. Firm-level controls include the cash-flow ratio and one-period lagged sales growth.
Firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated.
Firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific deflators. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆salest
(groups) (terciles) (median) (terciles) (median)
AEi × Aftert 0.011 0.011 -0.039 -0.039
(0.017) (0.017) (0.042) (0.042)
RE1 × Aftert 0.056*** 0.053
(0.019) (0.042)
RE2 × Aftert 0.00003 0.047
(0.018) (0.041)
RE3 × Aftert 0.034** 0.051
(0.017) (0.046)
Below Median RE 0.039** 0.054
(0.015) (0.034)
Above Median RE 0.021 0.045
(0.015) (0.037)
Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423 9,423 9,423
Firm, Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 9 also reports coefficients from estimating Equation 3 and 4, i.e. the real
effects of the policy change, but across the AE and the RE terciles (RE1, RE2 and
RE3) or groups demarcated by the median RE firm (above the median / below the
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median firm)28. This specification helps compare these results to the analysis presented
in Bhue, Prabhala and Tantri (2016). The authors compare the bottom and top tercile
of RE firms (RE1 and RE3) using only those RE firm groups in the regression, and find
a slowdown in growth of investment of about 5 percentage points, in a relative sense.
They do not report the coefficient on the dummy for the middle tercile. Using all small
firms as well as a reference category of never eligible firms, I find this difference-in-
difference estimate to be larger for the top tercile as in their analysis, but the difference
I observe is around 2.2 percentage points. On the middle tercile, I find a coefficient
of close to zero, albeit statistically insignificant. This result is not explained by the
strategic slowdown intuition suggested in their paper.29. I then split the RE group into
two groups (below and above the median RE firm) and find no evidence indicative of
a strategic investment slowdown in the upper group. In Table 19 in Appendix A, I
repeat these regressions using industry-time fixed effects and find very similar results.
7 Robustness Tests
7.1 Using Alternative Dependent Variables
In addition to growth in bank loan stocks, I measure the impact on bank loans and other
borrowings using different measures and repeat all the regressions. The re-estimate the
main specification given in Equation 1 with the following alternate dependent variables:
(i) ∆Y /Assets i.e the change in bank loans scaled by one period lagged assets
(ii) Y/Assets i.e. the level of bank borrowings scaled by lagged assets
(iii) Bank Loans/Total Loan i.e. the share of bank borrowings in total borrowings
28 The median and tercile groups are based on investment in plant and machinery in 2006-07
29 There is no explanation provided for absence of at least some investment growth post the policy
change for the middle tercile, even if the slower growth of the top tercile is strategic.
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Table 10: Robustness Test 7.1: Impact of Policy Change on Scaled Change
in Bank Borrowings
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on the change in bank borrowings scaled by assets across the firm groups, correspond-
ing to Equation 1. The dependent variable is change in bank borrowings scaled by one
period lagged assets. The other details are same as those in Table 5. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆Yt/Assetst−1) (1) (2) (3)
REi × Aftert 0.112* 0.022 0.146**
(0.057) (0.103) (0.074)
AEi × Aftert 0.0002 -0.339** -0.272*
(0.082) (0.161) (0.140)
REi × t 0.036 -0.048*
(0.058) (0.027)
AEi × t 0.139** 0.088**
(0.066) (0.043)
Number Of Observations 8,874 8,874 8,504
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
In Tables 10 and 11, I present the estimates from the specifications with the scaled
change in bank loans and the scaled level of bank loans, respectively, as the dependent
variables. The difference-in-difference estimates are statistically significant, and in the
direction of all the estimates presented in Section 6 (see Column 3 of Table 10)30. The
estimates in Table 11 correspond to the stock of bank loans, normalized by one-period
lagged assets. The RE firms increased their stock of loans by 4.1 percentage points,
while there is no evidence of any positive effect on AE firms31
30 The coefficient on the RE group is bit dampened, and on the AE group is much more negative
31 The coefficient on post-policy AE is negative but statistically insignificant.
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Table 11: Robustness Test 7.1: Impact of Policy Change on Level of Bank
Loans Scaled by Assets
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on the level of bank borrowings scaled by assets, corresponding to Equation 1. The
dependent variable is the ratio of bank borrowings to one period lagged assets. The other
details are same as those in Table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and
reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (Yt/Assetst−1) (1) (2) (3)
REi × Aftert 0.108 0.101** 0.041**
(0.091) (0.044) (0.019)
AEi × Aftert 0.077 0.0004 -0.017
(0.099) (0.060) (0.021)
REi × t 0.003 -0.011
(0.023) (0.009)
AEi × t 0.031 0.006
(0.022) (0.007)
Number Of Observations 9,192 9,192 8,820
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
7.2 Using Industry-Year Fixed Effects
I use industry-level output and growth series as controls for industry trends across
time. The results could be partially driven by measurement error in these industry-
level aggregates. So, I proxy for industry-time controls using industry-year fixed effects,
and re-estimate all specifications. Table 12 presents the results from estimating the
main regression Equation 1, estimating the impact of the policy change on the growth
of bank loans. I find results similar in magnitude and sign, with a positive coefficient
for RE, and a negative coefficient for AE firms. I repeat this check across terciles of
RE. The results are presented in Table 18 in Appendix A.
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Table 12: Robustness Test 7.2: Impact of Policy Change on Growth of
Bank Borrowings using Industry-Year Fixed Effects
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on the growth of bank borrowings, corresponding to Equation 1, using industry-year
fixed effects. The dependent variable is the change in log of bank borrowings.The dependent
variable is change in bank borrowings scaled by one period lagged assets. The other details
are same as those in Table 5. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported
in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
REi × Aftert 0.084** 0.190*** 0.207**
(0.042) (0.072) (0.088)
AEi × Aftert -0.041 -0.182* -0.262**
(0.067) (0.109) (0.133)
REi × t -0.036* -0.058
(0.020) (0.030)
AEi × t 0.051 0.071
(0.031) (0.046)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
In Table 13 above, I present the estimates from a robustness check using industry-
year fixed effects of the impact on real outcomes. The coefficients suggest a positive
effect post-policy change on RE firms of the magnitude of about 3 and 5 percentage
points on investment and sales growth. I repeat this estimation using terciles of the
RE group and find that RE1 grows faster than RE1, in a relative sense. However,
unlike Bhue, Prabhala and Tantri (2016), the magnitude of the difference-in-difference
estimate is only 1 percentage point.
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Table 13: Robustness Test 7.2: Impact of Policy Change on Growth of
Firm Investment and Sales using Industry-Year Fixed Effects
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on real outcomes - investment and sales growth, corresponding to Equation 3 and 4,
using industry-year fixed effects. The dependent variables are the investment-to-capital ratio
and total sales growth. The other details are same as those in Table 8. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆salest,t−1
REi × Aftert 0.027** 0.048*
(0.012) (0.027)
AEi × Aftert 0.009 -0.059
(0.017) (0.048)
CF i,s,t
Ki,s,t−1 0.094***
(0.023)
∆salest−1,t−2 -0.007
(0.008)
CF i,s,t−1
Ki,s,t−2 0.034
(0.028)
Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes
7.3 False Cut-Off Test
Since RE firms are bigger than AE firms in size by definition, the captured effect may
simply be driven by firm-size, i.e. bigger firms grow their bank credit faster during
this sample period. To check for such a possibility, I construct alternate control and
treated groups based on size. In Table 14, I present a case where I use medium and large
firms as the control and treated groups, respectively, and conduct the same differential
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impact analysis32. I do not find evidence of crowding-out of medium firms relative to
large firms. I estimate similar checks using an alternate dependent variable and using
industry-year fixed effects, discussed in Tables 20 and 21 in Appendix A.
Table 14: Robustness Test 7.3: Impact of Policy Change on on Growth of
Bank Borrowings using a False Cut-off
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change from 2004 to
2009 on the growth of bank borrowings, medium and large firms as control and treated
groups, respectively. The dependent variable is the change in log of bank borrowings. The
indicator LAi equals 1 if the firm is characterized as large (> 100 INR Mln in plant and
machinery) in 2006-2007. The other details are same as those in Table 5. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
LAi × Aftert -0.127** -0.170* -0.119
(0.053) (0.095) (0.122)
LAi × t 0.014 -0.058
(0.025) (0.030)
Number Of Observations 7,405 7,405 6,033
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
32 This exercise is which is akin to running a ‘placebo’ experiment. Other constructions of arbitrary
control and treatment groups available upon request.
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8 Conclusion
I exploit a change in the eligibility criterion of small firms to a nation-wide directed
lending program in India to analyze the crowding out of previously eligible firms by
the recently eligible firms. After an increase in the investment cut-off determining
small size status of firms, I find that the firms that were included in the pool of
program eligible borrowers, experienced an increase in the rate of growth of institutional
credit. This increased lending did not substitute for other forms of lending, which also
systematically rose during the years studied. On the other hand, the smaller of these
small firms that were previously eligible were crowded out as a result of competition
from their bigger counterparts in the loan market. The recently eligible firms also
experience increased investment and sales growth post policy change, while there is no
evidence of a any improvement in the real outcomes for the previously eligible small
firms. The expansion of this targeted lending program resulted in hurting the smaller,
more financially vulnerable firms, by distorting the lending incentives of institutional
lenders.
This study points to an important spillover effect of a regulatory change aimed
at the increasing credit access of small firms. Since banks are mandated to increase
priority sector credit as they grow their loan portfolios, they react by targeting the
bigger firms with bigger collateral. Policymakers must keep in mind such side-effects
of policy expansion which leaves smaller of the small firms worse off. One way to offset
such lending incentives is to implement strict sub-group targets along with overall
credit quotas for banks, so they are not incentivized to grow their loans by lending
disproportionately more to firms with bigger collateral, even at the cost of the smaller
of the small firms.
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Appendix A Additional Tables
A.1 More Descriptive Statistics
Differences in Time Trends
To check for differences in trends across the three groups of firms AE, RE and NE,
I run a regression of bank borrowings and firm sales, separately, and plot the sum of
residuals corresponding to each group.
yist = β0 + β1×IOst + β2×∆IOst + ist
In the regressions, I control for industry-specific business cycles using the aggregate
industry output IOst and growth rate of industry output ∆IOst. I find evidence of
time trend differences in both borrowings across the groups as well as in sales growth.
These differences are evident from the time plot of the group-wise residuals, as can be
seen in Figure 4 and 5. Hence, I control for a group-wise trend in all the estimations.
Summary Statistics – All Firms
As discussed earlier in the Data section, exporters are excluded from the analysis, due
to their special access to export credit programs in the time period of this study. For
the sake of the reader, I have provided a full summary statistics on firms in this period,
including the exporting firms, in Table 15.
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Figure 4: Plotting sum of group-wise residuals from the Bank Borrowings regression.
Source: Author’s calculations based on firm level data from the Prowess database
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Figure 5: Plotting sum of group-wise residuals from the the Total Sales regression.
Source: Author’s calculations based on firm level data from the Prowess database
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A.2 Additional Robustness Tests
Table 16: Robustness Test 7.1: Impact of Policy Change on Scaled Change
in Bank Borrowings (2004-2009)
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on the change in
bank borrowings scaled by assets, across firm groups and sub-groups of REi firms, corre-
sponding to Equation 2. The dependent variable is change in bank borrowings scaled by one
period lagged assets. The REi is split into terciles - RE1, RE2 and RE3. REi and AEi are
indicators which equal 1 if the firm belongs to that group in 2006-2007. The indicator Aftert
equals 1 for years after 2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size and
profitability are log(sales) and the EBIT ratio, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects, as
well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated. All borrowings are deflated using
the WPI, and firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific deflators. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆Yt/Assetst−1) (1) (2) (3)
AEi × Aftert 0.0001 -0.227** -0.272**
(0.082) (0.110) (0.114)
RE1 × Aftert 0.181*** 0.218 0.225
(0.063) (0.187) (0.189)
RE2 × Aftert 0.029 0.083 0.082
(0.072) (0.077) (0.084)
RE3 × Aftert 0.136** 0.121* 0.178**
(0.066) (0.074) (0.076)
Number Of Observations 8,874 8,874 8,504
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
46
Table 17: Robustness Test 7.1: Impact of Policy Change on Share of Bank
Borrowings in Total Borrowings (2004-2009)
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on the share of
bank borrowings across firm groups, corresponding to Equation 1. The dependent variable
is ratio of bank borrowings and total borrowings. REi and AEi are indicators which equal
1 if the firm belongs to that group in 2006-2007. The indicator Aftert equals 1 for years
after 2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size and profitability
are log(sales) and the EBIT ratio, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects, as well as
industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated. All borrowings are deflated using the
WPI, and firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific deflators. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Bank Borrowings/Total Borrowings (1) (2) (3)
REi × Aftert -0.035*** -0.043*** 0.032**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
AEi × Aftert -0.059*** -0.009 -0.025
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019)
REi × t -0.026*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.006)
AEi × t -0.017** -0.009
(0.007) (0.008)
Number Of Observations 11,086 11,086 8,816
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
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Table 18: Robustness Test 7.2: Impact of Policy Change on Growth of
Bank Borrowings using Industry-Year Fixed Effects (2004-2009)
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on the growth
rate of bank borrowings, across firm groups and sub-groups of REi firms, corresponding to
Equation 2. The dependent variable is change in log of bank borrowings. The REi is split
into terciles - RE1, RE2 and RE3. REi and AEi are indicators which equal 1 if the firm
belongs to that group in 2006-2007. The indicator Aftert equals 1 for years after 2006-2007,
the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size, fixed assets and profitability are
log(sales), growth(fixed assets) and the EBIT ratio, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects,
as well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated. All borrowings are deflated
using the WPI, and firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific deflators.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance
levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
AEi × Aftert -0.041 -0.181** -0.263**
(0.067) (0.108) (0.133)
RE1 × Aftert 0.176** 0.287** 0.106
(0.069) (0.116) (0.152)
RE2 × Aftert 0.040 0.203* 0.273**
(0.060) (0.108) (0.132)
RE3 × Aftert 0.051 0.098 0.229**
(0.064) (0.109) (0.114)
Number Of Observations 10,453 10,453 8,484
Group-level Time Trends No Yes Yes
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
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Table 19: Robustness Test 7.2: Impact of Policy Change on Investment
and Sales Growth using Industry-Year Fixed Effects (2004-2009)
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on real outcomes
- investment and sales growth, across the firm groups and sub-groups of REi firms, using
industry-year fixed effects, corresponding to Equation 3 and 4. The dependent variables are
the investment-to-capital ratio and total sales growth. The REi is split into terciles or by
the median. The indicator Aftert equals 1 for years after 2006-2007, the year of passing of
the Act. Firm-level controls include the cash-flow ratio and one-period lagged sales growth.
Firm and year fixed effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated.
Firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific deflators. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable It/Kt−1 ∆salest
(groups) (terciles) (median) (terciles) (median)
AEi × Aftert 0.009 0.009 -0.059 -0.059
(0.018) (0.017) (0.048) (0.048)
RE1 × Aftert 0.044** 0.036
(0.020) (0.042)
RE2 × Aftert 0.0008 0.042
(0.019) (0.042)
RE3 × Aftert 0.034* 0.063
(0.018) (0.046)
Below Median RE 0.031* 0.045
(0.016) (0.036)
Above Median RE 0.022 0.049
(0.016) (0.037)
Number Of Observations 9,423 9,423 9,423 9,423
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 20: Robustness Test 7.3: Impact of Policy Change on Growth of
Bank Borrowings using a False Cut-off, using Industry-Year Fixed Effects
(2004-2009)
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on on the growth
of bank borrowings, medium and large firms as control and treated groups, respectively,
and using industry-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the change in log of bank
borrowings. The indicator LAi equals 1 if the firm is characterized as large (> 100 INR
Mln in plant and machinery) in 2006-2007. The indicator Aftert equals 1 for years after
2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size, fixed assets and profitability
are log(sales), growth(fixed assets) and the EBIT ratio, respectively. Firm and year fixed
effects, as well as industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated. All borrowings
are deflated using the WPI, and firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific
deflators. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis.
Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
LAi × Aftert -0.133** -0.137 -0.111
(0.055) (0.097) (0.124)
LAi × t 0.001 0.008
(0.025) (0.041)
Number Of Observations 7,405 7,405 6,033
Industry-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
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Table 21: Robustness Test 7.3: Impact of Policy Change on Scaled Change
in Bank Borrowings using a False Cut-off (2004-2009)
This table reports the estimates of the impact of the policy change on on the growth
of bank borrowings, medium and large firms as control and treated groups, respectively,
and using industry-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the change in log of
bank borrowings. The indicator LAi equals 1 if the firm is characterized as large (> 100
INR Mln in plant and machinery) in 2006-2007. The indicator Aftert equals 1 for years
after 2006-2007, the year of passing of the Act. Controls for firm size and profitability
are log(sales) and the EBIT ratio, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects, as well as
industry-year fixed effects are included as indicated. All borrowings are deflated using the
WPI, and firm sales and assets are deflated using industry-specific deflators. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level, and reported in parenthesis. Significance levels are ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variable (∆Yt,t−1) (1) (2) (3)
LAi × Aftert -0.107 0.036 -0.077
(0.094) (0.125) (0.088)
LAi × t -0.058 0.023
(0.068) (0.030)
Number Of Observations 6,259 6,259 6,038
Industry-Year Controls Yes Yes Yes
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No No Yes
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Appendix B Definitions
B.1 Variables Definition
These definitions have been taken from the Prowess Database Dictionary:
1. Total Sales is the sum of industrial sales and income from non-financial services.
2. Total Assets refer to sum of all current and non-current assets held by a com-
pany as on the last day of an accounting period.
3. Gross Fixed Assets refer to the aggregate un-depreciated value of all of a
company’s gross fixed assets as on the last day of an accounting period. It is
essentially the sum of the costs of construction/acquisition. It also takes into
account capitalized expenses. If a fixed asset is sold at any point in time, the
historical cost thereof is deducted from the value of the gross fixed assets.
4. Gross Plant and Machinery is the total un-depreciated value of the installed
plant and machinery as at the end of the accounting period. These are essentially
production facilities for manufacturing goods.
5. EBITDA refers to earnings or profits before depreciation, interest, tax and amor-
tization. These are called PBDITA in the database.
6. Current Ratio is a liquidity ratio that measures a company’s ability to meet its
short term obligations, i.e. to pay off its short term liabilities, typically within
one year. A ratio below one implies inadequacy and a ratio just above one would
indicate a “just-about” adequate ability to meet current liabilities. But, a ratio
that is much above one would indicate too much of short term asset on hand that
could possibly be deployed for better long-term use.
7. Quick Ratio is the ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities. It measures the
ability of a company to pay its immediate or short term liabilities by using its
52
cash and near cash current assets. It is a more stringent measure of short term
liquidity as compared to the current ratio. Quick assets comprise a subset of
current assets - receivables and cash & bank balance.
8. Total Liabilities are the sum of all the resources deployed. They include all sums
owed to the shareholders in the form of share capital and reserves & surpluses, all
sums owed to lenders in the form of secured and unsecured loans and all current
liabilities and provisions. It also includes deferred tax liability.
9. Total borrowings includes all forms of debt; interest bearing or otherwise. All
secured and unsecured debt is included under total borrowings (so total borrow-
ings include debt from banks (short-term and long-term) and other financial debt
issued by financial institutions, government, RBI, syndicated loans, etc.
10. Total Bank Borrowings are the aggregate borrowings from banking institu-
tions, whether obtained from a single bank or a syndicate. All types of loans in
the form of short-term loans, long term loans, cash credits, bank overdrafts, etc.
are treated at par and all are clubbed under this category bank borrowing.
11. Total Forex Earnings is the sum total of the earnings of a company in terms of
foreign exchange, including earnings from - Export of Goods, Export of Services,
Forex earning Dividend, Forex earning Interest, and Deemed Export Sales.
12. Export Earnings is the total Free-On-Board (F.O.B.) the value of the goods
exported by a company, as disclosed in the notes to accounts in the balance sheet.
These include – Export of goods calculated on F.O.B basis, royalty, know-how,
professional and consultation fees, interest and dividends, and other income.
13. Export–Sales Ratio measures the export earnings through exports of goods
and services as a percentage of sales. This ratio provides a measure of the degree
of exposure of a company to exports markets, i.e. how much business does a
company generate by catering to export markets.
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B.2 Firm and Industry Controls
All level variables are scaled by lagged investment in fixed assets. Industry-level price
deflators are used wherever required.
1. Firm Size: Log(sales), where sales are deflated total sales.
2. Sales Growth: The change in log(sales), where sales are deflated Gross Sales.
3. Firm Utilization: The ratio of deflated total sales and lagged deflated assets.
4. Firm Profitability: The ratio of (EBIT - Depreciation - Amortization) scaled
by lagged deflated assets.
5. Default Risk Proxy: The current ratio or quick ratio.
6. Cash Flow Ratio: The deflated EBIT with depreciation added back, scaled by
deflated lagged assets.
7. Fixed Assets Growth: The change in deflated Gross Fixed Assets.
8. Industry Output: The deflated national-level industry-specific output.
9. Industry Output Growth: The change in deflated log(industry output).
B.3 Industry Aggregates and Deflators
Industry Specific Deflators
The Wholesale Price Index (WPI) is used to deflate the level variables. The data are
obtained from the Ministry of Commerce Industry website, which is responsible for
compilation of price data and release of All-Commodities WPI series and Industry-wise
WPI series. The borrowings variables are deflated by the all-commodities WPI, and
the firms’ level variables such as sales, assets, and profits, as well as the national level
industry-wise output are deflated by the industry-specific WPI series. I map the firm
two-digit industry code to the industry codes for which the WPI series are available.
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Industry Output Series
The national-level industry output and growth series are taken from the Annual Sur-
vey of Industries’ Historical Time Series collected by the Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation. These series span years 2003-2009. Since the National
Industrial Classification (NIC) were changed twice in the span of those years33, I map
the code books across the years to obtain a common series that corresponds to the NIC
2008 series. Each firm in the sample is mapped to one of the following industries:
1. Crop, Animal Production, Hunting
2. Mining and Quarrying
3. Food Products and Beverages
4. Tobacco Products
5. Textiles
6. Wearing Apparel
7. Leather and Related Products
8. Wood and Products of Wood
9. Paper and Paper Products
10. Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media
11. Coke and Refined Petroleum Products
12. Chemicals and Chemical Products
13. Basic Pharmaceutical Products and Preparations
14. Rubber and Plastics Products
15. Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products
16. Basic Metals
33 NIC 1998 was updated to NIC 2004, and NIC 2004 was updated to NIC 2008
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17. Fabricated Metal Products34
18. Computer, Electronic and Optical Products
19. Electrical Equipment
20. Machinery and Equipment n.e.c.
21. Motor Vehicles, Trailers and Semi-Trailers
22. Other Transport Equipment
23. Furniture
24. Waste collection, treatment, disposal activities
25. Publishing and related
34 Except Machinery and Equipment
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